Profit allocation of port and shipping alliance based on fuzzy Shapley considering risk

  • LAI Cheng-shou ,
  • LV Jing ,
  • GAO Tian-hang
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  • Transportation Management College, Dalian Maritime University,Dalian 116026,China)

Received date: 2017-02-21

  Revised date: 2017-04-01

  Online published: 2017-04-01

Abstract

The fuzzy Shapley value profit distribution strategy was introduced in view of the ambiguity of coalition investment. By constructing the bi-level programming model of cooperative game under various cooperating and competing situations among port and shipping companies, the triangular fuzzy payment function was constructed by model output result for fuzzy Shapely profit allocation. Considering the different risk type and degree among the alliance members, the risk factors were measured by using fuzzy AHP to correct the fuzzy Shapley income. Results show that the new strategy satisfies the alliance formation mechanism, and ensures a more scientific and rational distribution of the alliance income. The distribution strategy proposed solves the problem of unreasonable distribution of income in the uncertainty of alliance income.

Cite this article

LAI Cheng-shou , LV Jing , GAO Tian-hang . Profit allocation of port and shipping alliance based on fuzzy Shapley considering risk[J]. Journal of Dalian Maritime University, 2017 , 43(3) : 43 -49 . DOI: 10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2017.03.008

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