Journal of Dalian Maritime University >
2019 , Vol. 45 >Issue 2: 28 - 35
DOI: https://doi.org/10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2019.02.004
Evolutionary game analysis of hazardous goods management in ports based on system dynamics
Received date: 2018-10-09
Revised date: 2018-11-13
Online published: 2018-11-13
In order to study the safety management of dangerous goods in ports, a three-party evolutionary game model composed of government, resource providers and logistics service providers was constructed, and the simulation analysis was carried out by using the system dynamics. Results show that the factors such as supervision cost, punishment intensity, management cost and irregularities income can influence the game behavior of the government, resource providers and logistics service providers. In the process of dangerous goods management in ports, the government is the leader, and the government’s supervision strategy for port enterprises is the most ideal state. The strategy adopted by port enterprises largely depends on the size of the parameters determined by the government. The strategy choices of resource providers and logistics service providers are consistent. The government should punish logistics service providers more severely than the revenue from illegal operation of logistics service providers. Increasing government penalties can effectively reduce the rate of illegal operation of logistics service providers.
HAN Zhen , WANG Han , MENG Hao . Evolutionary game analysis of hazardous goods management in ports based on system dynamics[J]. Journal of Dalian Maritime University, 2019 , 45(2) : 28 -35 . DOI: 10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2019.02.004
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