In order to explore the effects of the tacit collusion of upstream ports on the carriers' endogenous timing and competition strategic variables in the maritime
In order to explore the effects of the tacit collusion of upstream ports on the carriers’ endogenous timing and competition strategic variables in the maritime container transportation chain, the motivation and stability of the tacit collusion of upstream ports under different competition mode of downstream shipping companies were analyzed in infinitely repeated games. Furthermore, the dual endogenous choices equilibrium of the shipping companies’ endogenous timing and strategic variables was solved. The results show that port collusion is the easiest to sustain under simultaneous quantity competition of shipping companies, but the most difficult to maintain under the BertrandCournot mixed competition where the shipping companies act at the same time. The shipping companies’ dual endogenous choices are not only related to the substitution of transportation services but also to the port discount factor. In equilibrium, carriers can engage in quantity competition with three kinds of move time modes, mixed competition of simultaneous actions, and the mixed competition where the liner competes in quantity as the leader while another chooses price as the follower. The research in this article can also provide a basis for the development and reform and transportation departments to strengthen the identification of ports tacit collusion.