Profit Distribution of Drayage Business Alliance Considering a Triangular Drayage Strategy

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  • (1. Institute of Logistics Science and Engineering, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China;2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China)

Received date: 2023-07-04

  Revised date: 2023-09-13

  Accepted date: 2023-09-13

  Online published: 2023-09-13

Abstract

To help drayage enterprise alliances achieve a trade-off operation with high efficiency and low costs, this study proposed a drayage enterprise alliance mode based on the “triangular drayage” strategy. First, a two-stage profit allocation model was constructed to facilitate the tasks within the alliance of truck scheduling, container route planning, and profit distribution among the member companies. Then, the designed model was verified and analyzed with CPLEX by taking a drayage company alliance in the container terminal as a study case. The results indicate that: (1) The drayage efficiency, and the alliance profit are improved through the proposed alliance mode based on ‘triangular drayage’; (2) In the least square profit distribution method based on profit and contribution, the companies with high-level profitability and contribution in alliance are allocated more reward, while their profit share decrease gradually as the increase of profit importance among enterprises alliance; (3) The weights of influencing factors (e.g., customer satisfaction, resource commitment, and risk-taking ability) are positively correlated with a company’s distributed profit. Finally, it is proved that the proposed two-stage profit distribution model can effectively improve the cooperation stability of alliance enterprises through comparing with the traditional profit allocation methods, e.g., the average distribution method and Shapley value method.

Cite this article

DING Yi, HU Yujing, CHEN Kaimin . Profit Distribution of Drayage Business Alliance Considering a Triangular Drayage Strategy[J]. Journal of Dalian Maritime University, 2024 , 50(1) : 113 -124 . DOI: 10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2024.01.013

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