大连海事大学学报 >
2017 , Vol. 43 >Issue 4: 39 - 45
DOI: https://doi.org/10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2017.04.006
不完全信息下集装箱班轮装卸费三阶段讨价还价博弈模型
收稿日期: 2017-03-14
修回日期: 2017-05-12
网络出版日期: 2017-05-31
基金资助
辽宁省社会科学规划基金重点项目(L15AJY014)．
Three phase bargaining game model of container liner handling charge under incomplete information
Received date: 2017-03-14
Revised date: 2017-05-12
Online published: 2017-05-31
付蔷 , 王诺 , 沈铭棋 . 不完全信息下集装箱班轮装卸费三阶段讨价还价博弈模型[J]. 大连海事大学学报, 2017 , 43(4) : 39 -45 . DOI: 10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2017.04.006
In order to study the bargaining process between the carrier and the port of loading and unloading expenses, according to Mr Rubenstein, a three stage in turn offer of bargaining game ideas, a bargaining game model was constructed to simulate the negotiating process and then to solve the model for the final revenue structure of both parties in different bidding order. The analysis shows that the final yield depends on the psychological pressure, the order of the bid and the bottom line price of the other party. Finally, the game strategies of each side are given in different bidding order.
Key words： container liner; handling charge; dynamic game; bargaining
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