交通运输工程

基于非合作博弈的区域港口默契合谋定价机理

  • 钟丹丹 ,
  • 董岗
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  •  (上海海事大学 经济管理学院,上海 201306) 
钟丹丹(1995—),女,硕士生,E-mail:dandan_Zhong@163.com.

收稿日期: 2018-04-26

  修回日期: 2018-06-06

  网络出版日期: 2018-06-07

基金资助

 国家自然科学基金资助项(71774109;71771143);上海市科研创新计划项目(2017-64).

Regional port tacit collusion pricing mechanism based on non-cooperative game

  • ZHONG Dan-dan ,
  • DONG Gang
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  • (School of Economics & Management, Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

Received date: 2018-04-26

  Revised date: 2018-06-06

  Online published: 2018-06-07

Supported by

 

摘要

为研究在日趋激烈的竞争环境中区域港口的定价策略选择,利用Bertrand模型建立单次同时博弈及序贯博弈模型,深入分析区域港口的定价策略内在机理. 此外,考虑到单次博弈不足以说明区域港口在长期博弈中的定价策略选择,故对区域港口在无限次重复博弈中的定价机理进行研究,并用算例对模型结果进行验证.研究发现:区域港口在竞争环境中也存在一定程度的默契合谋定价,并且这种默契合谋定价策略会随着博弈次数的增多而逐渐趋于稳定. 研究成果对港口资源整合中主管部门加强反垄断规制具有参考意义.

本文引用格式

钟丹丹 , 董岗 . 基于非合作博弈的区域港口默契合谋定价机理[J]. 大连海事大学学报, 2018 , 44(4) : 61 -67 . DOI: 10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2018.04.010

Abstract

In order to study the pricing strategy selection of regional ports in the increasingly fierce competitive environment, the Bertrand model was used to establish a single simultaneous game and sequential game model to deeply analyze the intrinsic mechanism of pricing strategies for regional ports. In addition, considering that the single game is not enough to explain the choice of pricing strategy of regional ports in long-term game, the pricing mechanism of regional ports in infinite repeated game was studied, and the results of the model were verified by examples. It is shown that there is a certain degree of tacit collusion pricing of regional ports in the competitive environment, and this tacit collusion pricing strategy will gradually stabilize with the increase of games number. The results have reference significance for authorities in the port resources integration to strengthen antitrust regulation.

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