为探究地方政府补贴政策对港口企业采纳绿色技术行为决策中的作用，运用演化博弈方法构建地方政府与港口企业之间的博弈模型。结合前景理论思想弥补了传统演化博弈理论中收益值为期望效用的缺陷，采用更加贴切的主观感知价值构建基于碳配额约束下博弈双方的损益矩阵。结果表明：当港口企业采纳绿色技术获得的主观感知收益与购买碳排放额的交易成本之和高于投入绿色技术的成本时，港口企业会自发的选择采纳绿色技术。为避免陷入政府补贴失效的状态，必须依靠补贴与碳配额的双重手段，才能形成港口企业自发采纳绿色技术的共赢局面。

In order to explore the role of local government subsidy policy in the decision-making of port enterprises’ adoption of green technology, the game model between local government and port enterprises was constructed by using the evolutionary game method. Combined with the idea of prospect theory, it made up for the expected effect of income value in the traditional evolutionary game theory, and adopted more appropriate subjective perceived value to construct the profit and loss matrix of both sides of the game based on carbon quota constraints. The results show that when the sum of the subjective perceived benefits of adopting green technology and the transaction cost of purchasing carbon emissions is higher than the cost of investing in green technology, port enterprises will spontaneously choose to adopt green technology. In order to avoid falling into a state of invalid government subsidies, it is necessary to rely on the dual means of subsidies and carbon quotas to form a winwin situation in which port enterprises spontaneously adopt green technology.