梯形模糊数改进Shapley值及其在货代联盟中的应用

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  •  (福建农林大学 交通与土木工程学院,福建 福州 350108;福建农林大学 金山学院,福建 福州 350002) 
刘明皓(1999 — ),男,硕士生,研究方向:物流工程与管理。 周台(1999 — ),男,硕士生,研究方向:物流工程与管理。 刘诗滢(2001 — ),女,硕士生,研究方向:物流工程与管理。 刘家财*(1983 — ),男,博士,副教授,博士生导师,研究方向:物流管理与供应链优化,E-mail:liujiacai@fafu.edu.cn。

网络出版日期: 2025-01-07

基金资助

国家社科基金一般项目(22BGL005)

Trapezoidal fuzzy number improved Shapley value and its application in freight forwarding alliance

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  • (College of Transportation and Civil Engineering, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350108, China; Jinshan College, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China)

Online published: 2025-01-07

摘要

货代联盟在实际收益分配中时常存在信息不完全或不确定的情况,如海洋运费浮动等。为有效解决模糊情境下货代联盟的收益分配策略问题,创建了梯形模糊数改进Shapley值。该合作博弈解通过均衡货代企业的满意度,进而提升货代联盟的稳定性,增强其市场竞争力。在模糊情境下,通过最小化超额贡献,实现局中人满意度最大化,据此计算出梯形模糊数最小二乘贡献,并用其代替经典Shapley值的边际贡献,从而创建梯形模糊数改进Shapley值。算例结果表明,梯形模糊数改进Shapley值充分考虑了局中人的满意度,使得收益分配策略更加公平、合理。梯形模糊数改进Shapley值能有效解决货代联盟等具有模糊不确定性的合作联盟的收益分配策略问题,进而促进合作联盟的稳定和持续发展。

本文引用格式

刘明皓, 周台, 刘诗滢, 刘家财 . 梯形模糊数改进Shapley值及其在货代联盟中的应用[J]. 大连海事大学学报, 2025 , 51(1) : 130 -140 . DOI: 10.16411/j.cnki.issn1006-7736.2025.01.014

Abstract

Freight forwarding alliances often have incomplete or uncertain information in the actual revenue allocation, such as ocean freight rate fluctuation. In order to effectively solve the problem of revenue allocation strategy of freight forwarding alliance under the fuzzy situation, the trapezoidal fuzzy number improved Shapley value is created. This cooperative game solution enhances the stability of the freight forwarding alliance and its market competitiveness by equalizing the satisfaction of freight forwarding enterprises. In the fuzzy situation, the satisfaction of the players is maximized by minimizing the excess contribution, according to which the trapezoidal fuzzy number least squares contribution is calculated and used to replace the marginal contribution of the classical Shapley value, thus creating the trapezoidal fuzzy number improved Shapley value. The example results show that the trapezoidal fuzzy number improved Shapley value fully considers the satisfaction of the players in the game, which makes the revenue allocation strategy more fair and reasonable. The trapezoidal fuzzy number improved Shapley value can effectively solve the problem of revenue distribution strategy of cooperative alliance with fuzzy uncertainty such as freight forwarding alliance, and then promote the stable and sustainable development of cooperative alliance.

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